The Regulation of Competing First Amendment Rights: A New Fairness Doctrine Balance After CBS? by Editors,
COMMENT
THE REGULATION OF COMPETING FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS: A NEW FAIRNESS
DOCTRINE BALANCE AFTER CBS?
[T]he Law is unknown to him that knoweth not the
Reason thereof and the knowne Certainty of the Law
is the Safety of all.
Sir Edward Coke*
The Federal Communications Commission's fairness doc-
trine holds radio and television broadcasters responsible for
presenting full and fair discussions of controversial issues of
public importance.1 This requirement has generated intense
disputes among three distinct groups: broadcast licensees, who
desire to present material of their own choice;2 individual
members of the public, who wish to speak out on the airwaves;
3
and the FCC, the protector of the public's right to be fully and
fairly informed, 4 which seeks to assure balanced treatment of
controversial issues.
There are three primary issues in dispute: What is an issue
of public importance? What is a fair presentation of differing
viewpoints? and Whose differing viewpoint is to be presented?
* E. COKE, INSTITUTES 395 (12th ed. 1738) (Epilogue Part 1, Book 3).
'Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as Report]; see Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973) (the fairness doctrine "imposes two affirmative respon-
sibilities on the broadcaster: coverage of issues of public importance must be adequate
and must fairly reflect differing viewpoints").
2 Broadcasters tend to find that few issues are controversial, that an adequate
balance has been achieved, and that, therefore, no other viewpoints need be presented.
It must be noted, however, that the reported cases are naturally biased to reflect only
those instances in which the licensee was claiming to have met its fairness doctrine
obligation.
3 Individual members of the public tend to find almost any issue to be controver-
sial. See, e.g., Jack Baker, 41 F.C.C.2d 727 (1973) (were arsonists angry homosexuals
and frustrated married persons?); American Vegetarian Union, 38 F.C.C.2d 1024
(1972) (virtues of meat versus a vegetarian diet); Mrs. Fran Lee, 37 F.C.C.2d 647 (1972)
(were dogs really man's best friend?).
4 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 383 (1969).
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In refereeing these disputes the FCC attempts to achieve a
position somewhere between the two extremes presented by the
other parties. Thus far, this riiddle position has been achieved
by the Commission without identifiable standards which would
aid individuals and broadcasters in predicting FCC decisions.5
The conflict among the asserted first amendment rights of the
broadcasters, individual citizens, and the general public (rep-
resented by the FCC) is, therefore, no closer to being resolved
through an agency "common law" than it was twenty-five years
ago when the fairness doctrine was first systematized by the
FCC.6 The FCC is not unaware of these problems. In a notice
of inquiry7 the Commission. has instituted "a broad-ranging
inquiry into the efficacy of the fairness doctrine . . . . to
determine whether the [Commission] policies derived largely
from [its] rulings should be retained intact or, in greater or
lesser degree, modified.
'8
It is the purpose of this Comment to propose standards
which could aid the Commission in reaching principled deci-
sions, while simultaneously protecting the first amendment
rights of all the affected parties. Before such proposals can be
offered, however, it is necessary to understand how the fairness
doctrine has been justified under the first amendment by the
Supreme Court, and how it has been applied by the FCC.
I. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
The regulation of the broadcast media is based upon the
"scarcity" of broadcast frequencies' and the cacophony which
prevailed prior to regulation. 10 Congress believed that com-
munication would be enhanced if the number of broadcasters
The type of problem that can result from the difficulty in predicting FCC
reaction to a particular broadcast was illustrated recently when ABC refused to air a
particular program in which Dick Cavett interviewed several members of the "Chicago
7." Although this dispute involved the interpretation of a term of Mr. Cavett's contract
with ABC, the underlying cause of the dispute was ABC's fear of disciplinary action by
the FCC if the program were to be held out of balance. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1974, at
58, col. 6; The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1974, at 12, col. 2. Such problems would
be greatly reduced by clear standards of controversiality.
6 Report, supra note 1.
7 Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971), 33 F.C.C.2d 554, 33 F.C.C.2d 800, 36
F.C.C.2d 40 (1972) (Docket No. 19620).
"Notice of Inquiry, 30 F.C.C.2d 26 (1971).
The "scarcity" of radio frequencies is the result of the natural limit on the
number of discrete channels that can be squeezed into any given frequency band, and
the reservation of much of the broadcast spectrum for government use.
0 The noise before regulation was the result of interference between stations close
to each other in radio frequency and geographic location.
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permitted to use the public's"1 air waves within a given geo-
graphic area were limited.
The Federal Radio Commission was therefore established
to assign frequencies, oversee station operations, and consider
the public interest in the granting and renewal of broadcast
licenses.' 2 The FRC and its successor, the FCC, interpreted the
public interest standard of the statute as imposing an affirma-
tive duty upon the licensees to present issues of public impor-
tance fully and fairly.' 3 The fairness doctrine remained an
agency creation until 1959, when it was given legislative en-
dorsement in the amendments to section 315 of the Federal
Communications Act.'
4
Under the doctrine, a licensee who presents one side of a
controversial issue has an affirmative duty to make reasonable
efforts to find appropriate spokesmen to present opposing
viewpoints. 15 If such spokesmen cannot or will not pay for air
time, the licensee must provide free time.' 6 If an appropriate
spokesman cannot be found, the licensee may be compelled to
present the opposing views himself. The balancing presentation
need not be as long as the original presentation,' 7 nor is there
any requirement that the licensee balance audience size, identity,
or other factors.' 8 The Commission, in reviewing any licensee
action, is not to consider the merits of the claim de novo, but will
examine the licensee's decision to determine if it was rea-
sonable.' 9 Finally, the complainant must comply with rather
stringent "pleading" requirements specifying the precise matter
that is alleged to be a controversial issue of public importance,
20
11 The public nature of the airwaves was first asserted legislatively in the Radio Act
of 1912, ch. 287, § 1, 37 Stat. 302, and does not appear to have been questioned since.
'2 Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 4, 44 Stat. 1163.
Congressman White, a sponsor of the Radio Act of 1927, stated:
We have reached the definite conclusion that the right of all our people to
enjoy this means of communication can be preserved only by the repudiation
of the idea underlying the 1912 law that anyone who will may transmit and by
the assertion in its stead of the doctrine that the right of the public to service is
superior to the right of any individual ....
67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1926).
13 Great Lakes Brohdcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929), rev'd on other
grounds, 37 F.2d 993, petition for cert. dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
14 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970), amending 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1958).
'5Report, supra note 1, at 1251.
16 Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576, 577 (1963).
'7 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1901, 1911 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Fairness Primer].
" Cf. Report, supra note 1, at 1250.
" Fairness Primer, supra note 17, at 1904.
20 Federation of Citizens Ass'ns of D.C., 21 F.C.C.2d 12 (1969).
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and alleging and pleading facts to support the claim that the
licensee has not balanced his overall programming.
21
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
The limitations imposed by Congress on the rights of indi-
viduals to speak out via radiowaves were held to be constitutional
in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States.22 However, it was not
until Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Com-
mission23 that the fairness doctrine, and the rules adopted to
effectuate that doctrine, were upheld as constitutional by the
Supreme Court.
A. Red Lion
In Red Lion the Court upheld against constitutional attack
those FCC regulations arising under the fairness doctrine which
require a station to offer reply time to the subject of a personal
attack 2 4 or political editorial.
25
The broadcasters in Red Lion asserted an unqualified first
amendment right that would have allowed the FCC to exercise
technical but not substantive control over licensees. Had the
broadcasters prevailed, the FCC would have been limited to
21 Id. at 13.
22 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
23 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
24 The applicability of the personl attack elements of the fairness doctrine, con-
tained in past FCC rulings, to a single broadcast of a licensee was one of the issues
presented to the court. Id. at 370-73. The rulings in question provided that when a
licensee's broadcast attacked an identified individual's or group's character, integrity,
honesty, or similar characteristics, the licensee must within one week notify the victim
that the attack had occurred; provide him with a tape or transcript of the attack; and
offer free air time for a reply. Times-Mirror Broadcasting Co., 24 P & F RADIO REG.
404 (1962). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the FCC's action in the face of a first amendment attack by Red
Lion Broadcasting Company, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), and Red Lion petitioned for certiorari.
2" While the Red Lion case was pending in the court of appeals, see note 24 supra,
the FCC initiated a rule making procedure for the purpose of promulgating the
personal attack and political editorial elements of the fairness doctrine as FCC regula-
tions. The personal attack rules were to incorporate the provisions outlined in note 24
supra. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, .300, .598, & .679 (1971) (these regulations are identical
but each is applicable to a different segment of the broadcast media). The political
editorial rules were very similar to the personal attack rules; any broadcaster that either
endorsed or urged the defeat of a candidate for political office was to notify the
disadvantaged candidate or candidates within 24 hours of the broadcast that the politi-
cal statement had been made; was to provide the candidate with a tape or transcript of
the statement; and was to offer free reply time. Id.
After the rule making procedure was completed, and the rules were adopted, the
Radio Television News Directors Association brought suit to have the rules declared
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enforcement of frequency assignments, power levels, and techni-
cal quality standards, and would have been without authority to
curtail attacks on individuals or groups; one-sided or slanted
news presentations, or outright fabrications. 26 The Court in Red
Lion reacted to this view of the broadcasters' first amendment
right2 7 subordinating the licensees' freedom of speech to the
public's right to be informed, characterized also as a first
amendment right.
28
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount. . . . It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ulti-
mately prevail, rather than to countenance monopoliza-
invalid on several grounds, among them that they were an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of the broadcasters' first amendment rights. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the rules as formulated could have an unconstitutionally
chilling effect on the broadcasters' right of free speech. Radio Television News Direc-
tors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002, 1012 (7th Cir. 1968). The FCC petitioned
for certiorari, presenting the Court with the issue of the constitutionality of the per-
sonal attack and political editorial aspects of the fairness doctrine as regulations to be
applied in future situations. 395 U.S. at 371.
26 The FCC claims not to examine the truthfulness of any facts presented in a
broadcast. The Commission will act on an accusation of inaccuracy only where there is
evidence extrinsic to the broadcast to document that the licensee has fabricated or
manipulated what is represented to be an objective report. E.g., Mrs. J.R. Paul, 26
F.C.C.2d 591 (1969).
27 Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice White said the broadcasters' "contention is
that the First Amendment protects their desire to use their allotted frequencies con-
tinuously to broadcast whatever they choose, and to exclude whomever they choose
from ever using that frequency." 395 U.S. at 386.
28 Looking to the technological peculiarities of the "new media," Justice White
mentioned other authority for qualifying first amendment rights in the public interest.
Citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) and Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945), he gave this example:
Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying equipment
potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech, so may the
Government limit the use of broadcast equipment. The right of free speech of
a broadcaster, the user of a sound truck, or any other individual does not
embrace a right to snuff out the free speech of others.
Id. at 386-87. After reviewing the scarcity doctrine basis of federal regulation of the
broadcast industry, he then indicated the limits on the first amendment rights of
broadcasters:
No one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio
frequency; to deny a station license because "the public interest" requires it "is
not a denial of free speech." [Citation omitted]
By the same token, as far as the First Amendment is concerned those who
are licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused. . ..
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government
from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and
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tion of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee.
29
The Court's reasoning was fairly straightforward. Technological
considerations demand that the number of persons permitted to
use the radio bands be limited. Given the congressional decision
not to assume direct government control over this scarce
resource, those persons who are licensed to use the airwaves
must operate in the public interest. Though the application of
this public interest standard may infringe upon the licensees'
first amendment rights, the superior right of the public to be
fully and fairly informed legitimizes that infiingement. The
FCC, in whom Congress has placed the responsibility for
protecting the public's right to be informed, has the authority,
under the statute and the constitution, to make such rules and
decisions as are necessary to give effect to this right of the public.
B. The Immediate Impact of Red Lion
Commentators discussing the Red Lion opinion saw quite
clearly that the FCC, as the protector of the public's right to be
informed, had been given a broad constitutional mandate to
assure "fairness" in the broadcasts of its licensees. 30 Most of
these commentators found that mandate to be somewhat
alarming.31 It seemed that despite the tempering language in
Red Lion,32 the rights of the broadcasters were heavily qualified,
and the FCC review of any program material, so long as it did
not amount to censorship, 33 was to be permitted.
A second, more favorably regarded, line of argument was
developed from some of the broad dicta contained in the Red
voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise,
by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.
Id. at 389.
29 Id. at 390.
30 See, e.g., Marks, Broadcasting and Censorship: First Amendment Theory After Red Lion,
38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 974 (1970); Note, The First Amendment and Regulation of Television
News, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 746 (1972); Note, A Fair Break for Controversial Speakers:
Limitations of the Fairness Doctrine and the Need for Individual Access, 39 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 532 (1971).
3' See, e.g., Note, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 746, supra note 30. For an excellent criticism of
the constitutional theory upon which regulation of the broadcast medium is based, and
the particular dangers of the fairness doctrine, see Robinson, The FCC and the First
Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv.
67 (1967).
32 395 U.S. at 395-96.
33 Censorship, in the context of FCC regulation, seems to mean only the imposition
of prior restraints on speech. Thus, the FCC cannot prevent the broadcast of a
particular program, but it could revoke the license of the broadcaster as punishment
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Lion opinion. That line of argument was that there was a
constitutional right of individual access to the airwaves.3 4 This
right was perceived both in the qualifications on the broadcast-
ers' first amendment rights (that they must operate in the
public interest) and in the FCC's power to compel presentation
of individual responses to personal attacks and political
editorials.35 It seemed a modest extension of Red Lion to hold
that individuals having minority views on issues of public im-
portance had the "right" to make those views known via the
broadcast media. If the result in Red Lion (granting a govern-
mental agency great control over the substantive content of
broadcasts in the name of the public's right to be informed)
could also be used to create an individual right of access, the
potential threat of government control of unpopular ideas
would be greatly reduced.
The Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Busi-
ness Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace (BEM), an anti-war
group, tried to establish the existence of such a constitutional
right. The holding in the resulting litigation, Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,36 fore-
closed hope for a constitutional right of individual access
and foreshadowed a more vigorous first amendment right in
the broadcasters.
C. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee
The issue presented in CBS was whether "responsible"
groups have a constitutional right under the first amendment
to purchase time for the presentation of advertisements and
programs in order to air their views about controversial issues
of public importance.37 The Supreme Court split seven to two
in holding that there is no such constitutional right. The large
majority was not unanimous, however, on the grounds for the
decision.
for having presented the program. In other contexts censorship has been held to
include more than the mere imposition of prior restraints on speech.4 See, e.g., Note, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 532, supra note 30; 85 HARV. L. REv. 689
(1972). But see Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections On Fairness
and Access, 85 HARV. L. REv. 768 (1972).
'" That is, the attacked individual has a regulatory right to access to rebut the
licensee's presentations. 47 C.F.R. § 73.679 (1972).
36 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
'7 The two groups claiming the right, BEM and DNC, were challenging decisions
of the FCC which, in the case of BEM, held that a radio station acted within its
authority in refusing to air. BEM's spot advertisement, and in the case of DNC, held
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Six Justices agreed that the first amendment would not
require the sale of time to responsible groups, even if state
action was involved.38 Three Justices (the Chief Justice and
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist) further opined that state action
was not involved.39 Justice Douglas concurred in the result,
40
interpreting the majority opinion to mean that state action was
not involved. While he tended to disagree with such a holding,
he said that accepting it necessarily implied that the first
amendment protected the broadcasters from any order of the
government telling them what to broadcast. Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, dissented 41 on the ground that the
FCC violated the first amendment rights of the public by per-
mitting licensees to refuse to sell time to groups or individuals
solely because they wanted to speak out about controversial
issues of public importance.
In concluding that regulation of the broadcast industry is
not so pervasive as to make the industry's actions state action,
Chief Justice Burger's separate opinion 42 favored striking a new
balance of competing constitutional rights in broadcasting. His
argument belittled the extent of FCC intervention in the day-
to-day affairs of its licensees and emphasized the amount of
journalistic discretion left to the broadcasters:
that as a general matter the DNC did not have a right to purchase time to speak out on
controversial issues of public importance. Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace,
25 F.C.C.2d 242 (1970); Democratic Nat'l Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the FCC,
holding that responsible groups did have a first amendment right to purchase broadcast
time, and remanded the case to the FCC for consideration of rules and regulations to
give effect to its opinion. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450
F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
38 The majority opinion consisted of Parts I, II, and IV of Chief Justice Burger's
opinion, which Justices Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, and Powell joined. The latter
three emphasized in their concurring opinion, 412 U.S. at 146-48, that the state action
question had not been decided.
39 Id. at 114-21. This was Part III of the Chief Justice's opinion. Justice Stewart also
wrote a separate concurring opinion, id. at 132-46.
40 Id. at 148-70. Justice Stewart indicated his empathy with Justice Douglas' opinion,
id. at 132.
41 Id. at 170-204. The dissenters argued, first, that the requisite state action may be
found in the government's permitting the state-created monopoly of broadcasters to do
that which the government could not do directly, id. at 172-81; and second, that the
first amendment public interest in "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate held to
be of prime importance in Red Lion mandated the individual right of access to the
Broadcast medium urged by BEM and the DNC, id. at 182-204. They compared the
situation to that in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), where
the Court had emphasized that the unavailability of editorial advertisements in news-
papers would serve to "shackle the First Amendment." 412 U.S. at 192.
42 Part III of the Chief Justice's opinion, 412 U.S. at 114-21, was joined only by
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. See note 38 supra.
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[T]he Commission acts in essence as an "overseer," but
the initial and primary responsibility for fairness, bal-
ance, and objectivity rests with the licensee. This role
of the Government as an "overseer" and ultimate arbi-
ter and guardian of the public interest and the role of
the licensee as a journalistic "free agent" call for a
delicate balancing of competing interests.
43
Congress has affirmatively indicated in the Com-
munications Act that certain journalistic decisions are
for the licensee, subject only to the restrictions im-
posed by evaluation of its overall performance under the
public interest standard.
44
After developing the separate indentities of the government
and the broadcasters for first amendment purposes,45 and
thereby demonstrating that BEM and DNC had no first
amendment claim, the Court's opinion nevertheless discussed
whether the first amendment mandated a right of access. The
Court looked to the requirements of the first amendment for
two reasons-first, there was no majority opinion on the state
action issue; and second, the public interest standard of the
Federal Communications Act necessarily incorporated some
first amendment interests which had to be explicitly addressed.
In an opinion in which four of his brethren concurred, the
Chief Justice balanced the first amendment rights of the broad-
casters against a first amendment right of access, and found a
43 412 U.S. at 116-17.
44 Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
45 This was the holding of the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist.
Justice Brennan's dissent drew a very different picture of the extent of FCC
regulation of the broadcast industry and the degree to which broadcasters are currently
compelled to be fair than did the majority opinion of the Chief Justice. Justice Brennan
stated that when regarding FCC regulation of the broadcast industry, one is "con-
fronted, not with some minimal degree of regulation, but, rather, with an elaborate
statutory scheme governing virtually all aspects of the broadcast industry. Indeed,
federal agency review and guidance of broadcaster conduct is automatic, continuing
and pervasive." Id. at 176-77 (footnotes omitted).
Discussing the effectiveness of the FCC and the fairness doctrine in bringing
controversial issues before the public, he then noted:
In fulfilling their obligations under the Fairness Doctrine , . .broadcast licen-
sees have virtually complete discretion, subject only to the Commission's gen-
eral. requirement that licensees act "reasonably and in good faith," "to deter-
mine what issues should be covered, how much time should be allocated, which
spokesmen should appear, and in what format." ...As a result, broadcasters
retain almost exclusive control over the selection of issues and viewpoints to be
covered, the manner of presentation, and, perhaps most important, who shall
speak. Given this doctrinal framework, I can only conclude that the Fairness
1974]
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greater risk to first amendment rights in a constitutionally
mandated right of access--"the risk of an enlargement of Gov-
ernment control over the content of broadcast discussion of
public issues. ' 46 He continued:
Under the Fairness Doctrine the Commission's re-
sponsibility is to judge whether a licensee's overall per-
formance indicates a sustained good-faith effort to
meet the public interest in being fully and fairly in-
formed. The Commission's responsibilities under a
right-of-access system would tend to draw it into a
continuing case-by-case determination of who should
be heard and when.
47
Justice Stewart, who concurred on the state action issue, found
a similar threat to first amendment rights in the then-current
"surveillance" of the broadcast medium by the FCC.48 And Mr.
Justice Douglas, concurring in the result, found that govern-
ment had no power to order broadcasters to carry any particu-
lar material.49 He would, therefore, find no place in our system
Doctrine, standing alone, is insufficient-in theory as well as in practice-to
provide the kind of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" exchange of views to
which the public is constitutionally entitled.
Id. at 185-87 (footnotes omitted).
The Chief Justice called attention to what he regarded as the desire of the dissent
"to have it both ways" on the related issues of pervasive control and discretion left in the
licensee manifested in the above two quoted sections. Id. at 116 n.15. He indicated
thereby that he found pervasive control by the regulatory agency to be conceptually
inconsistent with broad discretion being vested in the regulated industry. Such a con-
junction of conditions is not at all difficult to understand in light of the identity of the
views of the regulator and the regulated. It is likely that the agency has a great deal of
power that it uses only occasionally because the regulated industry is able to exercise its
discretionary power in such a manner as will almost surely meet with agency approval.
4 6 d. at 126.
47 Id. at 127 (footnote omitted).
4 8 Id. at 145-46 (Stewart, J., concurring):
' Those who wrote our First Amendment ... [b]elieved that "fairness" was
far too fragile to be left for a government bureaucracy to accomplish. History
has many times confirmed the wisdom of their choice.
This Court was persuaded in Red Lion to accept the Commission's view
that a so-called Fairness Doctrine was required by the unique electronic limita-
tions of broadcasting, at least in the then-existing state of the art. Rightly or
wrongly, we there decided that broadcasters' First Amendment rights were
"abridgeable." But surely this does not mean that those rights are nonexistent.
And even if all else were in equipoise, and the decision of the issue before us
were finally to rest upon First Amendment "values" alone, I could not agree
with the Court of Appeals. For if those "values" mean anything, they should
mean at least this: If we must choose whether editorial decisions are to be
made in the free judgment of individual broadcasters, or imposed by bureau-
cratic fiat, the choice must be for freedom.
49 1d. at 150-51.
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for the fairness doctrine, because he concluded that "TV and
radio stand in the same protected position under the First
Amendment as do newspapers and magazines.
50
It can be seen that CBS presented a very different judicial
picture of how broadcaster-FCC relations should be shaped
than did Red Lion. Where CBS drew an expansive licensee first
amendment right, Red Lion drew an expansive regulatory
power lodged by Congress, with constitutional sanction, in the
FCC. In CBS five Justices subscribed to a description of FCC
substantive review of broadcaster performance as one designed
"to judge whether a licensee's overall performance indicates a
sustained good-faith effort to meet the public interest . . .,.
This is not the description of- an expansive agency power to
regulate the affairs of its licensees, but rather a description of a
power to act in the face of consistently and persistently poor
performance.
Justice Stewart, concurring in the state action issue in CBS,
and Justice Douglas, concurring in the result, indicated that
they had serious doubts about the result reached in Red Lion,
and that the current impairment of the broadcaster's first
amendment rights rested, in their view, on shaky constitutional
ground. Thus all of the Justices who concurred in the CBS
result indicated that the broadcaster enjoys a substantial first
amendment right to control the content of his broadcasts, and
that the FCC review of that content is not to be on a case by
case standard, but rather on an overall good faith effort stan-
dard. The five Justices who concurred on the first amendment
issue52 also indicated that the FCC, through its application of
the fairness doctrine, is serving the public's right to full and fair
discussion of issues of controversy sufficiently well that an indi-
vidual right of access is at best not needed 53 and at worst
counterproductive.5 4 A brief examination of some of the FCC
fairness doctrine rulings between Red Lion in 1969 and CBS in
1973 will show that there is substantial room for disagreement
with both of these representations.
III. FCC DECISIONS
Before undertaking a review of the FCC's recent decisions,
a description of the framework within which the Commission
50 d. at 148.
51 Id. at 127.
52 Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.
53 412 U.S. at 118.
54Id. at 120-21.
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operates would be useful. The FCC has broad power to disci-
pline licensees for fairness doctrine violations. It has exercised
this power by ordering the presentation of balancing pro-
gramming55 and by refusing to renew licenses.5 6 Under the
Act,57 it also has the power to impose fines, 58 issue cease and
desist orders,59 give probationary license renewals, 60 order com-
parative hearings, 61 and revoke the license immediately.62 How-
ever, few of these latter sanctions are ever imposed for fairness
doctrine infractions.
Most fairness doctrine discipline is imposed by means of a
letter and "the lifted eyebrow," a technique that relies upon the
threat of action, rather than upon action itself. The "lifted
eyebrow," a phrase first applied to FCC procedures by Com-
missioner Doerfer,6 3 is the warning that a copy of the letter
notifying the licensee that he has violated the fairness doctrine
will be attached to his file for consideration at renewal time.
The licensee's fear is not that his license renewal will be denied,
but that he will be forced into a comparative hearing.64 Such a
hearing entails great expense and effort, as well as the risk that
some aspect of his operation other than the alleged violation of
the fairness doctrine will be found wanting.6 5
Even though only one license renewal has been denied
recently for a fairness doctrine violation,66 the mere threat of
nonrenewal is powerful. However, the effectiveness of the po-
tential nonrenewal sanction will inevitably decrease if it is fre-
5 5 E.g., Accuracy in Media, Inc., 40 F.C.C.2d 958, 967 (1973).
-1 Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc,, 24 F.C.C.2d 18, 35 (1970), petition for recon-
sideration denied, 27 F.C.C.2d 565 (1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 922 (1973). This case is the only one in which a station has been denied a
license renewal since the publication of the Report, supra note 1, in 1949, and the denial
followed persistent and willful violations. Nevertheless, the FCC resorted to procedural
as well as substantive bases for denying the renewal.
57 Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
58 Id. § 502 (providing a maximum fine of $500 per day).
59 1d. § 312(b).
60 Id. § 307(d).
1 1 Id. § 309(e).
62 Id. § 312(a).
63 Miami Broadcasting Co., 14 P & F RADIO REG. 125, 128 (1956) (Doerfer,
Comm'r, dissenting).
64 A comparative hearing is an adversary proceeding in which the current licensee
must prove that he can give better service to the listening or viewing public than can
any other applicant for the license. This involves elaborate and expensive audience
surveys and other proofs of serving the actual needs of the public. Total costs for each
party in a comparative hearing can easily reach into six figures. See generally Robinson,
supra note 31, at 115-18.
65 See, e.g., Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18, 28 (1970).
66 See note 56 supra.
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quently threatened but never carried out.6 7 The failure of the
FCC to deny the renewal of a license more frequently may
result from the Commission's reluctance to force a court test of
its power to deny renewal based upon an isolated fairness
doctrine infraction. As indicated above, the Red Lion holding
could be defended in straight broadcaster-individual68 first
amendment terms. Therefore, being unable to predict the judi-
cial response to an expansive fairness doctrine power, the FCC
may be content to leave that power unconfirmed, undefined,
and undenied.
The reluctance of the FCC to impose harsh sanctions for
fairness doctrine violations may also result from the Com-
mission's understanding of the financial importance of commer-
cial advertising to the continued "success" of the communica-
tions industry.6 ' The significance of advertising affects the
viability of the fairness doctrine in two ways. First, the only
product that radio and television stations have to sell is air time,
the value of which is determined by the size of the audience.
Part of that audience and, as a result, needed commercial ad-
vertisers, may be driven off by the broadcasting of controversial
material. Second, and more directly, if a television advertiser
sees his own message extolling the virtues of his product or
service followed by a fairness message pointing out why con-
sumption of the product may be unwise from a personal or
societal viewpoint, he may well choose to advertise in a less
"fair" forum.
For all of these reasons, the FCC and the broadcasters have
a common interest in keeping the number of fairness doctrine
violations as small as possible. The examples which follow illus-
trate the doctrines and policies that have been developed by the
FCC to minimize the necessity for disciplinary action and at the
same time to maximize the power to impose such discipline
should the commissioners find it necessary.
A. What Is an Issue of Public Importance?
The FCC's procedure for determining what constitutes an
issue of public importance can best be described as one of "gut
reaction." The Commission has relied on licensee discretion to
67 Cf. AESOP, THE SHEPHERD BOY AND THE WOLF (folk tale).
" That is, permitting the licensee to attack a person in his programming and then
to deny the attacked person an opportunity to respond in an effective manner could be
seen as a denial of the attacked individual's first amendment right to free and effective
speech. But note the state action problem with this theory.
6 See, e.g., Peter C. Herbst, 40 F.C.C.2d 115, 118 (1973).
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avoid the necessity of having to make these decisions itself. As a
result of this situation, program material and commercials
which could arguably be said to present one side of an issue of
public importance are held not to warrant issuance of a fairness
complaint on many grounds, none of which serve the public's
right to be informed.
The reluctance of the FCC to promulgate easily applied
criteria for determining what issues are of public importance
and the readiness with which the Commission will rely on the
licensee's judgment to that effect was reasonable when a fun-
damentalist complained about the failure of a television pro-
gram concerning the Darwinian theory of evolution to present
the Biblical story of creation.70 However, the presence of two
pieces of legislation on gun control, whose difference was pre-
cisely that urged by the complainant as an issue of controversy
(short-barrelled handguns as distinguished from "cheap, Satur-
day night special[s]"), was not sufficient either to create an
issue of public importance or to overturn the licensee's judg-
ment that no controversial issue had been presented.7 '
The most frequent bases for rejecting complaints are that
the licensee has exercised reasonable judgment in finding that
he has not presented an issue of public controversy; that the
70 Mrs. H.B. Van Velzer, 38 F.C.C.2d 1044 (1973). In deciding not to issue a
complaint in this case, the FCC staff denied that evolution was a controversial issue of
public importance, saying:
None of the material which you have furnished the Commission indicates that
at the time of the broadcast of the programs in question, the theory of
evolution was the subject of any legislative bill or debate, or other public action
or inquiry such as would demonstrate that evolution was a controversial issue
of public importance. Absent any substantial evidence of public controversy
and importance, the licensee's judgment in this matter stands uncontradicted
and may not be overturned.
Id. at 1046.
71 David I. Caplan, 38 F.C.C.2d 1027 (1973). In this case, the complainant re-
quested balancing time to correct the statement in an editorial by the station that
Arthur Bremer had used a "cheap, Saturday night special" in his attempt on the life of
Governor Wallace. Complainant urged that his information was that the handgun used
by Bremer cost eighty dollars, which did not qualify it as a "cheap, Saturday night
special." The complainant further urged that this was an important issue since there
were two pieces of legislation pending in Congress, one that would ban all short-
barrelled handguns and one that would ban only the "Saturday night specials"-guns
that did not meet standards of price and quality. The FCC decided that the "issue with
which [Caplan's] complaints against [the licensees] are concerned is gun control." Id. at
1030. It went on to say:
In regard to your complaints against WCBS you allege that the station has
used the term "cheap, Saturday night special" to mobilize public opinion
behind gun control and that contrasting views are necessary to distinguish
between the various types of handguns. . . . We agree with WCBS that the
programs which it broadcast dealt with gun control legislation; that any con-
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"issue" was presented in a commercial for which the Commis-
sion has created a general, though qualified, exception; 72 or
that one of the presumptions of noncontroversiality has not
been overcome in the complaint filed with the Commission.
1. The Reasonableness of the Licensees' Judgment
The licensee's judgment has been upheld as reasonable in
situations ranging from the trivial to the most serious. For
example, the licensee judgment that dog food commercials and
representations of dogs as faithful companions did not raise the
controversial issue whether dogs are man's best friend was up-
held as reasonable.73 When a slightly more weighty issue was
raised by a vegetarian who sought programming to balance a
broadcast in which Dr. Maxwell Stillman and Adele Davis made
generally unfavorable comments about an all vegetable diet, the
FCC upheld as reasonable the licensee's judgment that the
merits of vegetarian (as opposed to omnivorous) diets were not
an issue of public importance. 74 Given the widespread discus-
sion of conservation and gun control, however, the FCC deci-
sion upholding a licensee judgment about the controversiality
of the program Say Goodbye is more troublesome. This program
represented that certain species of animals were being hunted
to extinction; nevertheless, the Commission determined that the
program did not present the controversial issue of hunters'
contribution to and impairment of the conservation of animal
species.75 Similarly troublesome was the FCC decision that
Planned Parenthood Association spots discussing the "problem
of overpopulation" did not raise an issue of public importance
because there was no public controversy about overpopulation
as a problem or about family planning as a proposed remedy.76
troversy over the types of guns which are the subject of proposed legislation is
only part and parcel to the real issue of gun control; and that the issues raised
on your complaints were not separable issues of public importance which
demand a reasonable opportunity to present contrasting views.
Id. at 1031.
72 The commercial exception is discussed at length in Section IV, infra (notes
147-92 and accompanying text).
73 Mrs. Fran Lee, 37 F.C.C.2d 647 (1972).
74 American Vegetarian Union, 38 F.C.C.2d 1024 (1972). A similar example of a
complaint that appeared to be properly denied was a claim that an issue of public
importance was presented by a newscaster's report that a fire department official had
asserted that most arsonists were "angry homosexuals and frustrated married partners."
Jack Baker, 41 F.C.C.2d 727 (1973).
7' National Sportsman's Club, Inc., 30 F.C.C.2d 636 (1971).
76 Dr. John H. DeTar, 32 F.C.C.2d 933 (1972).
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2. Sub-Issues and Alternate Issues
In addition to insulating itself from direct determination of
issues of public controversy via the licensee judgment proce-
dure, the FCC has managed to complicate the area by creating
a category called sub-issues which need not be fairly treated.
The FCC decision in National Broadcasting Co.7 7 is cited for this
doctrine. 8
In November of 1967, the National Broadcasting Company
presented a series of reports, as part of the Huntley Brinkley
Report, entitled Air Traffic Congestion and Air Safety. During one
of these reports the network presented two "typical" pilots: an
extremely competent, professional pilot flying for a commercial
airline, and a happy-go-lucky private pilot for whom flight
plans were rough estimates of where he was going and how he
was going to get there. The reporter did not comment on the
relative qualifications of the two pilots, but it was implied that
the private pilot, who admitted to actions which violated many
FAA regulations, was a potential hazard. NBC did emphasize
that such private pilots were major contributors to air traffic
congestion. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association filed a
complaint urging that NBC had presented one side of the
controversial issue of the relative safety of private versus com-
mercial pilots in congested airlanes. The Commission re-
sponded that the issue complained about, the safety of private
pilots, was subsidiary to the central concern, congestion over
airports,' 9 and therefore could not properly be reviewed as a
distinct issue.
If every statement, or inference from statements or
presentations, could be made the subject of a separate
and distinct fairness requirement, the doctrine would
be unworkable. More important, as we have pointed
up recently in an analogous situation ... such a policy
" 25 F.C.C.2d 735 (1970).
78 See, e.g., David I. Caplan, 38 F.C.C.2d 1027, 1030-31 (1973).
71 The broadcasts in question dealt with the issue of congestion over airports
and the hazards raised by such congestion. Spokesmen for both the commer-
cial and private (general) air interests were given a reasonable opportunity to
address themselves to this congestion issue . . . . We have examined the
November 5th broadcast, with a view to the charge that it also raised the issue
that the private pilot is a hazard because of the nature of his training. But no
NBC personnel or other person so stated. On the contrary, the thrust of the
program is the congestion over large airports ....
The case thus really turns on inferences which are drawn by complainants
from presentation of two typical pilots-one a commercial and the other a
private pilot.
25 F.C.C.2d at 737.
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of requiring fairness on each statement or inference
from statements would involve this agency much too
deeply in broadcast journalism. 0
The Commission was careful to indicate the limits of the sub-
issue exception to the fairness doctrine: "the licensee could not
cover an issue, making two important points in his discussion of
that issue; afford time for the contrasting viewpoint on one of
these two points; and on the other point, reject fairness re-
quests on the ground that it is a 'sub-issue.'"81 In limiting its
holding to the facts of the case, 82 the FCC failed to justify its
decision. Two grounds might be suggested: that sub-issues need
not be fairly treated, or, in the alternative, that sub-issues are
not issues of public importance.
83
The strategy of defining an issue differently than the com-
plainant does is frequently used by the FCC. For example, the
natural mother of a child which had been placed in a foster
home filed a complaint with the FCC, alleging that station
WNEW-TV had violated the fairness doctrine in its coverage of
the legal proceeding 84 which she had instituted to obtain cus-
tody of her son. Of thirty-three minutes of coverage, only
four-and-one-half were favorable to the complainant, while
views favorable to the adoptive parents were presented for
twenty-two minutes.85 However, the Commission, apparently
relying on six-and-one-half minutes of coverage of the efforts
to change New York's adoption laws, denied the complaint,
stating:
Although the licensee covered in some detail the
case of Ferro v. Bacile, including the interviews with the
foster parents to which you refer in your complaint, it
does not appear to have been unreasonable for the
licensee to determine that the controversial issue of
public importance discussed in the broadcasts was the
state of the adoption laws in New York and not the
particular case of Ferro v. Bacile. 
86
80 Id. at 736.
" Id. at 737.8 2 Id. at 736.
83 The FCC decision itself is not clear. The normal procedure in an opinion seems
to be to cite several grounds for a decision, emphasize none, and then announce a result.
'4 Ferro v. Bacile, 35 App. Div. 2d 550, 314 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1970) (no written
opinion), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 537, 268 N.E.2d 121, 319 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1971).
1.- Bernard T. Callan, 30 F.C.C.2d 758, 759 (1971).
86 Id. at 760-61. The FCC then found that the presentation on the "issue" of the
state of New York's adoption laws had been balanced, despite the fact that no presenta-
tion asserting the continuance of the status quo had been made. Id. at 761.
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A somewhat similar situation resulted from the FCC's de-
nial of a complaint which alleged that the WNET program,
Hunger: A National Disgrace, had unfairly presented the issue
whether hunger in this country was a national disgrace. The
FCC found that the program dealt with the solutions of the
hunger problem and not with whether it was a national dis-
grace, thereby finding that the title of the program had nothing
to do with its content.
87
3. The Foreign Affairs Exception
The FCC has developed an exception to the requirements
of the fairness doctrine for coverage of foreign affairs, by
interpreting the phrase "issue of public importance" to include
only those issues that have a direct bearing on events affecting
the United States. The FCC gave voice to this policy in J.F.
Branigan,s8 when it held that the conflict in Northern Ireland
was not a controversial issue of public importance. The Com-
mission reasoned:
[U]nless events in a foreign country involve the ques-
tion of United States relations or involvement with
respect to that country, and in the absence of evidence
that a controversial issue of public importance exists in
this country regarding such matters, it would not be
unreasonable for a licensee to conclude that its cover-
age of such events does not present a controversial
issue of public importance within the meaning of the
fairness doctrine.8 9
The FCC thus seems to have ruled that an issue involving
foreign affairs is not controversial unless it is controversial in
the United States or it implicates United States foreign policy.
Given the apparent circularity of the first test,90 it seems that
the second test is going to be the sole touchstone of when
fairness is required for news coverage of foreign events.
The significance of the boundaries of the foreign events
exception becomes clear in the context of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict in the Middle East, a foreign event about which broadcast
87 American Conservative Union, 23 F.C.C.2d 33 (1970).
88 31 F.C.C.2d 490 (1971).
89 Id. at 491.
90 It is arguable, of course, that this test refers to a level of controversiality which
would cause rifts in the United States parallel to the events abroad; e.g., in J.F.
Branigan, if the Northern Ireland conflict became an issue of significant dispute be-
tween American Protestants and Catholics.
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programming must be balanced. This conflict has been held to
be a controversial issue of public importance in recent years,
but, again, only as it implicates United States foreign policy in
that region. 91 However, the background and causes of this
conflict, which is currently an important aspect of United States
involvement overseas (and therefore an appropriate subject for
application of the fairness doctrine) was not an issue that was
required to be fairly treated for an extended period of time.
Thus, most of the average television viewer's information about
the Mideast conflict is the result of programming which was not
required to be fair, and may potentially have been one-sided.
Similar exceptions presumably exist for the news treatment of
the Greek and Chilean juntas, the Filipino suspension of civil
rights, the war in Bangla-Desh, and other "foreign" events.
In ari age of international interdependence, and in a nation
that rightly or wrongly regards itself as an international police-
man, balanced information about foreign events, even if those
events do not directly concern United States policy, would seem
to be an essential part of the public's right to be fairly and fully
informed. By creating a presumption that foreign events do not
raise controversial issues of public importance, the FCC is cater-
ing to administrative convenience at the cost of serving its
highest duty-seeing that the public has the information neces-
sary to make intelligent decisions.
4. Private Disputes
With the backing of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, the FCC has carved out another "excep-
tion" to the general requirements of the fairness doctrine
-news coverage of essentially private disputes need not be
"fair" unless there is evidence that the dispute is a controversial
issue of public importance. 92 The reasoning in support of this
exception is that treatment of an event as newsworthy does not,
in and of itself, indicate that the issue involved is important or
controversial in the public's eyes.93 However, the exception
should not be read as holding that an issue is never controver-
sial when it involves two private parties engaged in a private
dispute. It has been held, for example, that commercials adver-
tising goods for sale at retail stores which are engaged in a
91 See, e.g., Federated Organizations on American-Arab Relations, 30 F.C.C.2d 892
(1971) (discussing complaint about the news coverage of the Mideast war as if it were a
subject that should be balanced).
92 National Football League Players Ass'n, 39 F.C.C.2d 429 (1973).
'3 Healey v. FCC, 460 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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labor dispute with their employees may raise a controversial
issue of public importance.9 4 Labor disputes are certainly pri-
vate disputes, normally involving relatively few employees and
little disruption of the local economy, and an advertisement
does not carry the implications of controversiality and public
importance inherent in a news report. Once again, the distinc-
tions drawn by the FCC are hazy ones.
5. Summary
This survey of some of the difficulties in merely determin-
ing whether an issue which was unequivocally presented in a
broadcast is subject to the fairness doctrine illustrates how little
the FCC has done to formalize its decision rules. The judgment
of the licensee will be upheld in most cases unless some particu-
lar fact indicates to the FCC that it should not be; licensee
definition of sub-issues and alternate issues will be upheld un-
less the Commission finds cause to disagree; foreign events are
generally exempt from the requirements of the fairness doc-
trine unless United States foreign policy is involved; private
disputes need not be fairly reported unless the Commission
decides that they are not really private.
A recent FCC decision, Accuracy in Media, Inc.,95 illustrates
the difficulties of attempting to predict how these "rules" will
apply in any specific case. NBC, the defendant broadcaster,
urged that its program Pensions: The Broken Promise did not
discuss the broad subject of the private pension system in this
country, but rather addressed the problems experienced by the
beneficiaries of some plans. 96 The complainant argued that the
tenor of the program was generally critical of the private pen-
sion plan system and that the implication was that controls were
needed. The FCC reviewed the program and determined that it
was not restricted to the problems of the pension system, but
was represented as being an overview of the system as it then
existed.9 7 The criteria by which NBC's judgment in this case
was found to be unreasonable were not specified.
Citing the absence of newspaper, magazine, political, or
broadcast discussion of pension plans, NBC further urged that
14 Retail Store Employees, Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970); accord,
National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 39 F.C.C.2d 1019 (1973).
95 40 F.C.C.2d 958 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-2256, D.C. Cir., Dec. 21, 1973.
For a description of how this case illustrates the problem of "Who Decides Fairness?",
see TIME, Feb. 4, 1974, at 59.
96 40 F.C.C.2d at 959.
97 Id. at 963-66.
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the subject of pension plans was not a controversial issue of
public importance. The broadcaster maintained that the pro-
gram was newsworthy but not controversial. 9  The FCC dis-
agreed, but for reasons that seemed to be inconsistent with its
previous decisions:
[Y]our argument [that the absence of public discussion
of the issue indicates that it is not an issue of public
importance] misinterprets the definition of a "con-
troversial issue of public importance" as it pertains to
the applicability of the fairness doctrine. As both the
Commission and the courts have stated, underlying the
fairness doctrine is "the paramount right of the
American public to be informed as to events and issues
of public importance." . . . This right would be obvi-
ously vitiated if a broadcaster presenting one side of an
issue of public importance could avoid his fairness ob-
ligations on the ground that members of the general
public had little knowledge of the subject and hence
were not engaged in any discussion of or debate on
that issue.!"'
The FCC then cited Congressional hearings and proposals for
the regulation of the pension system, and the opposition to
such proposals by most of the organizations currently operating
private pension plans, as evidence of controversiality sufficient
to hold the licensee's judgment to have been unreasonable. 100
A comparison of this decision with cases previously dis-
cussed indicates the extent to which FCC decisionmaking is one
of gut reactions. The program on pensions is arguably similar
to the program on hunger 0 1 in that Pensions can be said to
have presented the issue of the existence of problems in the
private pension system and to have suggested one method
(regulation) of curing those problems; the extent of such prob-
lems in the system would then be a sub-issue. The absence of
discussion of the private pension system in any public forum,
which was so important in the evolution,
10 2 foreign event, 0 3
" Id. at 966.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 966-67.
"' Note 87 supra & accompanying text. Note also that Hunger was broadcast on the
eve of the White House Conference on Hunger and Nutrition.
102 Mrs. H.B. Van Velzer, 38 F.C.C.2d 1044 (1973) (discussed at text accompanying
note 70 supra).
103J.F. Branigan, 31 F.C.C.2d 490 (1971) (discussed at text accompanying notes
88-89 supra).
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and population 0 4 cases, was dismissed as meaningless by the
FCC in Pensions. Finally, the presence of legislative hearings
and proposals, held implicitly to be meaningless in the handgun
case, 10 5 was dispositive in Pensions. While all of the above cases
can be distinguished from Pensions, it is important to note that
those differences can hardly be said to outweigh the similarities.
It is not asserted that Pensions is "wrong," or that the other
cases are "right," in some absolute sense; but, surely, it is desir-
able to allow persons outside of the FCC to be able to predict
the outcome of disputed cases and to be able to discern those
differences between cases that are crucial and those that are
not. At present this is not possible. The regulatory agency
apparently possesses absolute discretion. Maximum power is
retained in the FCC because it must, in the absence of stan-
dards, resolve every dispute. 10 6 As a result of the Commission's
apparent reluctance' 0 7 to have this discretionary system tested
in court, the FCC does not generally use that discretion to
bring more complete information to the viewing and listening
audiences. This discretionary system is carried out in both of
the other two disputed areas-balanced presentations and who
should balance.
B. What Is a "Fair" Presentation of Differing Viewpoints?
The question of what constitutes a fair presentation of
differing viewpoints must be considered by the complainant
almost before he knows that he is going to complain. Although
there does not appear to be any information about the genesis
of a fairness complaint, one would expect that such a complaint
is normally sparked by a 1rogram that has, in the opinion of
the complainant, presented only one side of a controversial
issue. It is unlikely that most complainants would have scanned
all of the licensee's broadcasts for a reasonable time, perhaps as
long as three to six months before the offending program, in
the expectation that they would see a one-sided presentation;
yet this seems to be an essential part of making an honest
complaint.
The Commission has placed the burden of going forward
with a complaint on the complainant. He must therefore pro-
104 Dr. John H. DeTar, 32 F.C.C.2d 933 (1972) (discussed at text accompanying
note 76 supra).
105 David I. Caplan, 38 F.C.C.2d 1027 (1973) (discussed at text accompanying note
71 supra).
100 Cf II A.M. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 528 (1959).
107 This reluctance is discerned in the large number of rejected complaints as
compared with the very small number of complaints resulting in FCC action.
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vide "the Commission with... information which indicates that
the licensee in its overall programming has failed to present
contrasting views on the" controversial issue. 10 8 This statement
was made in a case in which the complainant had asked the
licensee to provide information concerning any additional re-
lated controversial programming. Upon the licensee's refusal to
do so, 10 9 the complainant requested the FCC to compel disclos-
ure of the requested information. The FCC responded to this
request as follows:
Although you request that the Commission "or-
der" the licensee [to] furnish information concern-
ing timing, frequency, duration, complete texts, etc. of
the [controversial] commercials, we do not require
licensees to furnish material absent some such showing
[of overall imbalance]. Thus a complainant must "(a)
specify the particular broadcast in which the controver-
sial issue was broadcast, (b) state the position advocated
in such broadcasts, and (c) set forth reasonable
grounds for concluding that the licensee in its overall
programming has not attempted to present opposing
views on the issues.
110
To meet this burden, either a complainant must be prescient,
or he must have been planning to lodge a complaint for some
period of time and have systematically monitored the licensee's
broadcasts.
108 Peter C. Herbst, 40 F.C.C.2d 115, 117 (1973).
109 Although it appears reasonable to question the good faith of a station that
refuses to cooperate with a request for information that is more easily available to it
than to the individual viewer or listener, the FCC clearly does not do so. The inconsis-
tency of the FCC's notion of good faith and reasonableness can be appreciated by
comparing the facts in the Peter C. Herbst decision with Accuracy In Media, 40 F.C.C.2d
958, 966 (1973) (Pensions):
Serious questions as to the reasonableness of your judgment are raised,
first, by the previously cited evidence [quotes from the transcript of the pro-
gram] that the program . . .went considerably beyond a mere presentation of
"the fact that problems exist with some private pension plans." . . . More
importantly, however, your argument misinterprets the definition of a "con-
troversial issue of public importance" as it pertains to the applicability of the
fairness doctrine. As both the Commission and the courts have stated, under-
lying the fairness doctrine is "the paramount right of the American public to
be informed as to events and issues of public importance."
As discussed above, the indicia of controversiality are not well spelled out, but to
find that misunderstanding those already unclear standards is evidence of unreason-
ableness is rather harsh. Notice also the circularity of the offered indicia of contro-
versiality.
110 40 F.C.C.2d at 117 (quoting Allen C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C. 12 (1970)).
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Assuming that the complainant has the information neces-
sary to have his complaint investigated, he must still demon-
strate that the issue has not been presented in a balanced
fashion. This is not a burden easily carried. The FCC has not,
in the thirty-nine years of its existence, defined a ratio of
majority to minority viewpoint air time which will be considered
balanced for fairness doctrine purposes.111 It has, in fact, dili-
gently avoided even the appearance of defining such a ratio.
112
In addition to the pleading and numerical ratio problems
of balance, there are problems of audience size and identity,
the formatting of the balancing presentation, and the suffi-
ciency of an offered but unused opportunity to appear on a
broadcast. The FCC will normally look only to the time devoted
to the two sides of an issue to determine if it has been
balanced-for example, an interview with a party representing
one side of a controversial issue which is broadcast as part of a
prime time newscast can be balanced by a Sunday morning
interview of the other side. Thus, spot announcements by the
Planned Parenthood Association were held to have been bal-
anced, so far as they advocated some form of birth control, by
panel discussions and talk shows that presented, as one of many
others, the views of the Catholic Church on family planning.
113
There are, however, serious weaknesses in the FCC's ap-
proach. It is quite clear that the number and the identity of the
people in the audience will vary enormously between the two
"' Ad Hoc Committee to Defeat the Transportation Bond Issue, 32 F.C.C.2d 458,
459 (1971).
12See Complaint of Wilderness Society, 31 F.C.C.2d 729, 737 (1971) (Burch,
Chairman, concurring):
[I]t is . . . necessary to ask "what do past Commission precedents tell us
about [the proper ratio of commercials to counter-commercials]?" And I am
forced to conclude that the answer, after twenty years of administration of the
doctrine, is "virtually nothing"....
And I strongly suspect that the issue has not been resolved precisely
because it is so thorny. I for one find it impossible to feel very confident or
secure about a process that relies on the stop-watch approach-that is, making
judgments, and then quantifying the category into which each presentation
falls. And this is only the beginning. There are such additional ramifications as
the time and style of the various presentations (does a prime-time spot count
two times more heavily than a mid-morning interview? three times? or ten
times?), the size and make up of the audience, and ... the relative weight that
should be accorded an indirect commercial announcement as against the direct
rebuttal that would be afforded under a remedial fairness doctrine ruling. . ..
It might even be argued that we have to consider the dial switching habits of
the average viewer-which means that only rarely does he recall where he
viewed which side of what controversial issue! The road here could lead to a
series of decisions with enough variables and shadings to rival a medieval
religious tract.
" James G. Morris, 23 F.C.C.2d 50 (1969).
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broadcasts. Furthermore, it is possible that the formats of the
two presentations may have some impact on their relative
effectiveness. 
1 4
Finally, a serious distortion in the FCC's mandate to assure
that the public is fully and fairly informed of issues of public
importance results when an opportunity to reply is offered but
not accepted, and is nonetheless held sufficient to meet the
licensee's fairness doctrine obligation. Although an unused
offer of air time has not been the basis of any holding that a
licensee had met its fairness doctrine obligation, such an offer is
one factor that is frequently cited by the FCC as a determinant
of the decision not to grant a complaint. In American Conserva-
tive Union," 5 which held that the Hunger program had not
presented the controversial issue whether hunger in this coun-
try is a national disgrace, the FCC noted that the defendant
broadcaster had offered the complaining group twenty tickets
for that part of the show during which questions were to be
taken from the audience,'" 6 with the implication that this meas-
ure may have balanced the presentation about which ACU had
complained.'1 7 Similarly, while denying that there was any need
for the licensee to balance its coverage of the Ferro v. Bacile
child custody case, the FCC noted that WNEW had attempted
to interview Mrs. Ferro, the natural mother, and that she had
declined to be interviewed.""
One would trust that the issue, as the FCC itself has stated,
is not who presents the other side, but rather whether the
other side is presented at all. To cite the rejected offer as a
reason for denying a complaint is to ignore both the mandate
of the FCC' and its own pronouncements on the issue. 12
C. Whose Differing View Is To Be Presented?
Under the Cullman doctrine, a licensee is obligated to pro-
vide free time to spokesmen for opposing points of view when
those spokesmen cannot or will not pay for it.121 However, no
114 In the commercial cases to be discussed below, text accompanying notes 147-92
infra, the issues of audience size and identity are quite important because some of the
commercial messages are delivered during prime-time shows, while most of the bal-
ancing presentations occur during documentary, news, or public affairs programming.
115 23 F.C.C.2d 33 (1970).
116 Id. at 34.
117 The FCC pointed out, however, that a number of contrasting views were
presented on the program by panelists and members of the audience.
"8 Bernard T. Caplan, 30 F.C.C.2d 758, 759 (1971).
119 Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
120 E.g., Mrs. J.R. Paul, 26 F.C.C.2d 591 (1969).
12, Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963).
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individual or group has the right either to present his particu-
lar view or to have his special viewpoint presented; 122 the licen-
see has the discretion to select whom he considers to be the
most appropriate spokesman for the most appropriate opposing
view. 123 Only when a licensee's broadcast attacks the "personal
qualities of an identified person or group" or endorses or
opposes a political candidate in an editorial is the licensee obli-
gated to provide the attacked or opposed person, group, or
candidate free time in which to respond.
124
The licensee's discretion on this issue is particularly appar-
ent in the context of an election. Although federal legislation
requires a licensee who permits use of his broadcast station by a
candidate for office to provide similar access to all other
candidates 125 at a charge limited by Congress,126 it neither re-
quires nor prohibits variations below the ceiling to give effect to
the policy of permitting all candidates to speak out. Addition-
ally, when a supporter of a candidate rather than the candidate
himself appears, either to endorse his candidate or to criticize
the other candidate, the fairness doctrine rather than federal
legislation governs.12 7 Although a licensee, absent unusual cir-
cumstances, is limited in his choice of who should respond to
such a broadcast, 128 he is not obligated to provide free time for
such a response.
2 9
Cases that arose during the 1972 presidential election cam-
paign made it apparent that these doctrines can be manipulated
to preserve any monetary advantage that a political party can
seize and to make it difficult for third (or fourth or fifth) party
candidates to get their message to the voting public. In Thomas
R. Asher,130 the Committee to Elect McGovern-Shriver (CEM-S)
filed a complaint with the FCC alleging that the "Democrats for
122 Fairness Primer, supra note 17, at 1913.
123 Id.
124 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1973). The licensee is also obligated to give notice of the
broadcast and provide a transcript thereof to the person or group attacked. Id.
125 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
126 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (Supp. 1972), amending 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1970). This
provision has been interpreted to mean that Candidate B gets equal time for the price
paid by Candidate A. See Dr. Benjamin Spock Peoples' Party, 38 F.C.C.2d 316, 319
(1972) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
127 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(4) (1970) (providing equal time only in response to appear-
ance by candidate himself). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
382-83 (1969).
128 A spokesman or supporter of the other candidate is the logical choice as
appropriate spokesman and, therefore, absent unusual circumstances, it would be un-
reasonable for the licensee to choose someone else. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707,
708 (1970). )
129 Id.
130 38 F.C.C.2d 300 (1972).
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Nixon" were sponsoring spot advertisements which "'grossly
distort[ed] the position of the Democratic Party's Presidential
nominee . . . on one of the most important, fundamental, and
controversial issues of the current campaign-welfare
reform.'"131 The CEM-S, which was not well financed, asked
that it be given free air time to present its side of the welfare
reform issue. The Commission denied the request, finding both
of the CEM-S's justifications for free air time invalid. The first
ground, urging the suspension of Zapple132 when a political spot
grossly and maliciously distorted the opponent's position about
a fundamental campaign issue,1 33 was rejected for the same
reasons that the Zapple doctrine had been originally promul-
gated: it was inappropriate for the FCC to interfere with the
financing of political campaigns. 34 The second ground, that
the advertisements were virtually a personal attack on
McGovern,135 was dismissed with the observations that the spot
was not a personal attack, and that even if it were, personal
attacks by spokesmen for political candidates are exempt from
the provisions of the personal attack rules.1
36
Similarly, the Dr. Benjamin Spock Peoples' Party urged
that Dr. Spock be granted free air time in which to present his
position, alleging a fairness doctrine violation based upon the
network news treatment, or nontreatment, of Spock's presiden-
tial campaign. 137 The FCC first treated the request for free
speaking time for Dr. Spock as an equal time complaint, and
dismissed it as inadequately pleaded.1 38 It then considered the
fairness doctrine aspect of the complaint: that Dr. Spock's can-
didacy was one side of an issue of public importance which had
not been adequately treated by the three major networks. Al-
though not addressing the merits of the issue because of a
procedural defect in the filing of the complaint,139 the Commis-
sion did assert that a network policy of largely ignoring the
campaigns of "fringe" candidates for political office could be
perfectly consistent with the fairness doctrine.
1 40
131 Id. at 300.
132 Notes 128-29 supra & accompanying text.
133 38 F.C.C.2d at 301.
134 Id. at 303.
135 Id. at 301.
3Id. (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1973)).
137 Dr. Benjamin Spock Peoples' Party, 38 F.C.C.2d 316 (1972).
'3 id. at 317.
139 Id. at 318.
140 Id. This policy was not new to the 1972 presidential campaign. In the Fairness
Primer, supra note 17, promulgated by the FCC in 1964, the Commission stated that a
licensee who provided time, either free or for a fee, to one of the major party
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As the law stands now, a minority candidate has the right
to reply to political editorials 141 and the statutory right to air
time in the same quantity and on the same terms as it is used
by other candidates, if he can afford it.142 A major party candi-
date has not only these rights; merely by virtue of being a
major party candidate, he also has substantially more access to
air time, if he can afford to purchase it. 143 The minority candi-
date, who must rely on the fairness doctrine, may be excluded
from the air or given only token amounts of time deemed
reasonable by the licensee, even though he may be able to pay
for more time. 144 If, as in the last presidential election, one
party has a large amount of money and the other is poorly
financed, the well-heeled party can exploit that advantage and
put its message before the public in a one-sided manner with
the full approval of the FCC. Moreover, if the financially well-
off candidate does not himself appear, but uses spokesmen and
advertisements instead, he will avoid providing the other candi-
dates with the more powerful equal time appeal for air time.
This system violates both the spirit and language of the first
amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Red Lion.
The FCC's duty, the Court said, is to serve the public's right to
be informed. 45 The standard described in this section cannot
be said to serve any interests but those of the broadcasters in a
larger profit margin 46 and those of the politicians in erecting
barriers to the creation of viable minority parties.
candidates for a political office for the purpose of soliciting campaign contributions was
obligated to provide time to the other major party candidate on the same terms for the
same purpose. The Commission went on to say:
But it does not follow that if there were, in addition, so-called minority
party candidates for the office . . . , these candidates also would have to be
afforded a roughly equivalent number of similar announcements. In such an
event, the licensee would be called upon to make a good faith judgment as to
whether there can reasonably be said to be a need or interest in the community
calling for some provision of announcement time to these other parties or
candidates and, if so, to determine the extent of that interest or need and the
appropriate way to meet it.
Id. at 1912.
141 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1973).
142 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
143 The views of a major party candidate are presumed to be an issue of public
importance.
144 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
145 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
146 This results both from not having to provide free time to impecunious candi-
dates and from avoiding the alienation of parts of its audience as a result of presenting
controversial candidates.
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IV. DISCRETION LOST AND REGAINED: THE COMMERCIAL CASES
The reticence of the Commission to promulgate clearer an-
swers to the questions posed above may be influenced in part
by the disastrous results, from the FCC's point of view, which
followed the Commission's cigarette ruling. 147 Therefore, be-
fore this Comment proposes any standards to fill the gap al-
ready described, it might be instructive to review a case in
which the FCC was at pains to announce clearly the principles
upon which it had made its decision, and the subsequent appli-
cation of those principles by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit to areas into which the Commission
did not want to move.
For most of the years of its existence, the FCC's policy had
been largely to ignore the advertising of legitimate products on
the air.1 48 Whether this was the result of a conscious policy of
noninterference or merely of an absence of complaints is not
clear. However, in 1967 the Commission's attention was di-
rected to cigarette advertising, and it responded dramatically.
John F. Banzhaf, III, wrote to WCBS-TV, in New York City,
requesting air time to present the other side of the issue
whether people should smoke cigarettes, an issue that he al-
leged was presented in the cigarette advertisements aired by the
station. In its reply to Banzhaf CBS stated that it did not
believe that the fairness doctrine applied to ordinary product
advertising and that the station had a continuing policy of
presenting the anti-smoking viewpoint in its news coverage. 149
Banzhaf then turned to the FCC, which issued an advisory
letter to CBS.' 50
The advisory letter to CBS caused an uproar in the broad-
cast and advertising industries because it stated, first, that
cigarette commercials were subject to the fairness doctrine and,
second, that the controversial issue presented by the cigarette
advertisements would have to be balanced over relatively short
time intervals.' 5' This implied, and resulted in, counter-
commercials. The result of this uproar was a multi-party appeal
147 Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967) (normally cited as Applica-
bility of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising), affd sub nom. Banzhaf v. FCC,
405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).148 Id. at 926.
149 Id. at 922.
150 This was contrary to the FCC's normal procedure of advising the broadcaster
that a complaint had been filed and asking for additional comment prior to issuing an
advisory letter. Id. at 953 (Loevinger, Comm'r, concurring).
151 Id. at 941. The FCC suggested weekly balancing.
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to the FCC to reconsider its position. 152 The petitioners urged
reconsideration on eight grounds, only four of which are rele-
vant to this discussion: that the fairness doctrine did not apply
to commercial advertising; that a blanket ruling that any cig-
arette commercial raised an issue of public importance was im-
properly broad; that the present ruling could not logically be
limited to cigarette commercials; and that extending the fair-
ness doctrine to commercial messages in general would drive
advertisers to less "fair" forums and destroy the financial basis
of the broadcast industry.
153
Addressing itself to the first objection, that the fairness
doctrine did not apply to commercial messages, the FCC ig-
nored its original statement of the fairness doctrine in the
Report on Editorializing1 54 and Congress' endorsement of the
doctrine in section 315.155 Both of these documents refer to
news and public affairs programming and are silent about
commercials and entertainment shows. The FCC looked instead
to the public interest standard as authorization for the fairness
doctrine's applicability to commercial messages, saying, "We be-
lieve that the licensee's statutory obligation to operate in the
public interest includes the duty to make a fair presentation of
opposing viewpoints on the controversial issue . . .posed by
cigarette advertising .... 156
In its discussion of the broad ruling that any cigarette
commercial raised a controversial issue, the Commission held
that where the issue is whether a product should or should not
be used, any commercial advocating its use presented one side
of a controversial issue. The Commission flatly rejected an
argument that commercials of lawful businesses offering lawful
products for sale could not be controversial.1 57
Turning to the "slippery slope" argument that the cigarette
152 Id.
1'53 Id. at 923-24. The petitioners also alleged that the fairness doctrine violated the
first and fifth amendments of the Constitution; that Congress had pre-empted the field
in the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970); that the FCC's
decision requiring weekly balancing, see note 151 supra, would substitute "commission
fiat" for licensee judgment; and that the ruling was invalid because interested parties
were not given an opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of a novel policy
determination. Id.
154 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
155 "Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters,
in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries,
and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation .. . to afford reasonable
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance." 47
U.S.C. § 315(a)(4).
156 9 F.C.C.2d at 927.
15
7 Id. at 940.
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ruling could not be logically limited to cigarettes, the FCC said:
Our ruling [that cigarette commercials raise fair-
ness obligations] does not state, and was in no way
meant to imply, that any appeal to the Commission by
a vocal minority will suffice to classify advertising of a
product as controversial and of public importance.
Rather, the key factors here were twofold: (1) Gov-
ernmental and private reports and congressional action
with respect to cigarettes, and (2) their assertion in
common that "normal use of this product can be a
hazard to the health of millions of persons."
We adhere to our view that cigarette advertising
presents a unique situation.
15 8
Finally, in rejecting the contention that imposing the fair-
ness doctrine upon commercials would drive advertisers to
other forums, the Commission asserted the superiority of the
broadcast media as a means of reaching a large audience. In
the FCC's opinion, this superiority would clearly outweigh any
disadvantages resulting from counter-commercials. 15'
The Commission stated in summary that the obligation to
cover both sides of the issue presented by cigarette commercials
"stems not from any esoteric requirements of a particular doc-
trine but from the simple fact that the public interest means
nothing if it does not include such a responsibility." 6 ' In an
insightful concurring opinion, Commissioner Loevinger ques-
tioned this application of the public interest standard. "Rep-
etitious reference to the public interest as establishing whatever
conclusion is contended for is no more than question-begging.
The 'public interest' is a judgment encompassing whatever the
person making the judgment deems to be socially desirable."'
' 61
He went on to express concern that the cigarette ruling could
not be limited to cigarette commercials and that, as a result, the
fairness doctrine would suffer.16 2 As it developed, Commis-
158 Id. at 943.
159 Id. at 944.
160 Id. at 949. Note also that in the subsequent court test of the cigarette ruling, the
"public interest" test was narrowed to a "public health" test and the ruling was af-
firmed. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969).
161 9 F.C.C.2d at 953.
'6
2 Id. at 954. Commissioner Loevinger continued:
Further, I am concerned that extension of the Fairness Doctrine to adver-
tising is likely to lead either to its attenuation to the point of ineffectiveness or
its broadening to a scope that is wholly unworkable. No matter what the
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sioner Loevinger was correct in his assessment of the
Commission's ability to restrict the cigarette ruling to cigarettes.
The first major effort to enlarge the scope of the cigarette
ruling was launched by environmentalists. Encouraged by the
passage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA),163 which declared a national policy of reducing en-
vironmental pollution and which "authorized and directed"
164
government agencies to further that goal, the Friends of the
Earth (FOE) objected to those automobile and gasoline adver-
tisements which emphasized speed, power, and performance.
The FOE complaint stated that WNBC-TV, in New York City,
had denied their request for time to present the other side of
the controversial issue of automobile pollution raised by these
advertisements, on the basis that the station had already bal-
anced its presentations on the air pollution issue. 1
65
While noting that a commercial could deal directly with a
controversial issue, 166 the FCC denied the complaint. Although
in the cigarette case and this case the commercial in question
was a general product advertisement, the Commission argued,
first, that a clear line could be drawn between the danger
presented by cigarettes on the one hand and the danger pre-
sented by cars and gasoline on the other. The smoking of
cigarettes was harmful per se and was the target of government
agencies, whereas the use of cars and gasoline was both benefi-
cial and harmful.1 67 Noting that the environmental problems
caused by automobiles were also caused by "a host of other
products or services-detergents . . . , gasoline . . . , electric
power, airplanes, [and] disposable containers,"1 68 the FCC also
argued that the public interest standard required it to weigh
the gains to be achieved by balancing the car and gasoline
advertisements against the potential damage to the broadcasting
industry that could result if commercial advertisers selected
another less "fair" forum.' 69
Commission now says about the distinction between cigarette advertising and
other types of advertising, it is establishing the principle that the Fairness
Doctrine applies to commercial advertising, as distinguished from paid political
broadcasting. The Commission will be hard pressed to find a rational basis for
holding that cigarettes differ from all other hazards to life and health.
Id.
163 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. 1973).
164 Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'65 Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970), rev'd, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
166 Id. at 749.
16 7 Id. at 746.
1
6 8 Id.
169 Note how quickly the Commission's confidence in the superiority of the broad-
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However, even assuming that we are wrong in
[the] belief [that cigarette advertising presents unique
problems that set it apart from all other advertising],
we would not extend the ruling generally to the field
of product advertising. That is what, in effect, com-
plainant urges since, as stated, a great many products
have some adverse ecological effects. Were we to
[extend the cigarette ruling], the result would be the
undermining of the present system, based as it is on
such commercials. Such a result is not consistent with
the public interest. It is not required, since there is the
alternative of providing advertiser-supported program-
ming, valued by the public, by means of the product
commercial .... In short, our action must be guided
by one standard, the public interest.
170
In this statement one sees signs of Commissioner Loevinger's
characterization of the public interest standard as meaning
whatever the person applying it wants it to mean.
1 71
The Friends of the Earth were not persuaded by the FCC's
reasoning and appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, the same court which had earlier affirmed
the FCC's cigarette ruling.172 While this action was pending, the
environmentalists, taking the FCC's cue concerning products
similar to high performance cars,17 3 kept up their attack.
In Alan F. Neckritz, 174 the complainant alleged that adver-
tisements which claimed that Standard Oil of California's F-310
gasoline reduced automobile emissions presented one side of a
controversial issue that had not been properly balanced. Com-
plainant urged two bases for his complaint: that the Federal
Trade Commission had issued a complaint alleging that the
commercials in question were deceptive,175 thus making the
advertisement itself controversial; and that the commercial ap-
pealed to a subject of general concern, air pollution, in order to
sell its product, thereby raising that issue. 176 The FCC rejected
the complaint because issuance of an FTC complaint did not
cast media, as a deterrent to mass defections of advertisers to other forums, has faded.
See text accompanying note 159 supra.
170 24 F.C.C.2d at 749.
7 See text accompanying note 161 supra.
172 Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969).
173 See text accompanying note 168 supra.
174 29 F.C.C.2d 807 (1971).
175 Id. at 807.
1
6 Id. at 808.
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create a controversial issue (the FCC felt that it was socially
desirable to have manufacturers advertise "improvements" in
their products), and because gasoline was different than
cigarettes. 17 7 The Commission noted that it would extend the
fairness doctrine to a product commercial, other than a com-
mercial for cigarettes, only when a commercial directly ad-
dresses a controversial issue of public importance.1
7 8
In William H. Rodgers, Jr.,17 9 the complainant sought to
have fairness doctrine obligations imposed upon licensees who
broadcast commercials for phosphate detergents. Citing the in-
ternational, national, federal, and local actions designed to re-
duce the pollution resulting from phosphate detergents, the
complainant urged that commercials advocating the use of such
detergents, when other nonpolluting alternatives were available,
presented one side of an issue of public importance. 180 The
FCC responded by saying that general product commercials do
not create fairness obligations, making no attempt to distinguish
the phosphate detergent case from the cigarette case. The
Commission therefore held that the licensee had exercised
reasonable judgment in finding that no issue had been
raised. 8
In Wilderness Society,182 the FCC held that three Standard
Oil of New Jersey (Esso) commercials discussing the desirability,
feasibility, and environmental impact of drilling for oil on the
North Slope of Alaska directly raised the controversial issues of
"(i) the need for developing the oil reserves in Alaska at this
time and (ii) the ecological effects which may ensue from such
development.' 8 3 In so holding, the Commission rejected the
licensee's argument that the commercials were merely institu-
tional advertising discussing Esso's search for oil and its concern
for the environment. Without discussing whether the licensee's
judgment-that it had balanced the issue presented-was
reasonable and made in good faith (the ostensible test of licen-
see performance), the FCC found that the judgment was in
error. 84 This case, with its forceful finding of controversiality
17 Id. at 810-11 (citing Friends of the Earth, 24 F.C.C.2d 743, 748-49 (1970)).
7
8 Id. at 812.
179 30 F.C.C.2d 640 (1971).
18o Id. at 640-41.
181 Id. at 642.
182 30 F.C.C.2d 643 (1971).
183 Id. at 646. Despite this rather clear statement, the FCC later declared that only
one issue was presented in this case, the proposed construction of the Alaska Pipeline,
and found that this single issue had been balanced by later presentations. Complaint of
Wilderness Society, 32 F.C.C.2d 714 (1971). •
184 30 F.C.C.2d at 646.
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and imbalance, was apparently an attempt by the Commission
to illustrate the difference between the direct presentation of a
controversial issue, which is subject to the requirements of the
fairness doctrine, and a general product commercial, which is
exempt.
At this point the Friends of the Earth cars and gasoline case
was decided by the court of appeals. The Commission had
framed the issue in its most basic terms: "whether the Commis-
sion reasonably refused to extend to gasoline and automobile
commercials its ruling with respect to cigarette commercials."'
18 5
The court found that it had not acted reasonably.
Where the Commission departs from [the cigarette
ruling] is in insisting that, because cigarettes are
unique in the threat they present to human health, the
public interest considerations which caused it to reach
the result it did in [that case] have no force here.
The distinction is not apparent to us, any more
than we suppose it is to the asthmatic in New York
City for whom increasing air pollution is a mortal
danger.
186
Noting the Commission's resolve in the cigarette case to
limit the applicability of the fairness doctrine to the area of
cigarette commercials only, the court held that the FOE and
Neckritz dicta, asserting that a commercial could directly present
a controversial issue, and the Esso case, so holding, vitiated the
effect of such a resolve.'
87
Four months after the court's decision in FOE, a complaint
was filed with the Commission alleging that a licensee had not
adequately balanced commercials advertising trash compac-
tors. 1 8 The complainant alleged that the commercials in ques-
tion presented one side of the issue of recycling, a method of
reducing pollution and preserving the environment encouraged
by the National Environmental Policy Act.' 8 9 The FCC denied
the complaint, stating that "[t]he Commission has consistently
refused to apply the fairness doctrine to the broadcast of ordi-
nary product commercials, and the commercials herein do not
come within the exception to that policy enunciated in [the
cigarette and car and gasoline cases]."' 190 The FCC, however,
185 449 F.2d at 1168.18 6 Id. at 1169.
187 1Id. at 1169-70.
188 John S. MacInnis, 32 F.C.C.2d 837 (1971).
189 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. 1973).
190 32 F.C.C.2d at 838.
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did not state why the compactor commercials fell without the
exception; it did not state why compactors were different than
cars, gasoline, detergents, electric power, airplanes, or other
products in the class which the FCC's reply to FOE in the
original car and gasoline complaint had implied are subject to
the fairness doctrine; nor did it discuss the effect of the court's
waiver or vitiation theory on the "ordinary product" exemption
from the requirements of the fairness doctrine.
In a more recent case,"" the FCC addressed itself to the
continued viability of the ordinary .product commercial excep-
tion:
We do not read the Friends of the Earth case as
requiring an extension of the fairness doctrine to vir-
tually all ordinary product commercials; rather, the
Court's holding there is limited to the particular adver-
tisements and public health issues involved, and is ex-
pressly stated to be on the grounds that pending the
outcome of an overall inquiry [initiated by the FCC],
the health hazard issue in Cigarette Advertising ruling
cannot be distinguished from that in Friends of the
Earth. 192
At the present time, in addition to all of the other areas of FCC
discretion, the Commission seems to be claiming as a conse-
quence of a narrow reading of FOE, broad powers to determine
how hazardous to human health a product must be before
commercials advocating its use are subject to the fairness
doctrine.'
9 3
V. PROPOSALS
The success of the environmentalists in applying the stan-
dards articulated in Cigarette Advertising to areas into which the
FCC did not want to go may explain why the Commission has
been so reluctant to promulgate standards of controversiality
and balance. It is nevertheless difficult to see any viable reasons
for treating essentially similar situations differently. The pro-
posals set forth in this section represent an attempt to develop a
coherent fairness doctrine policy which accommodates the in-
terests of the public, the individual, and the broadcaster and
191 Hudson-Mohawk Group, 40 F.C.C.2d 119 (1973).
192Id. at 123.
193 A recent development in the commercial area is the refusal by the major
networks to accept Mobil Oil Company's offer to buy advertising time for its critics,
provided the networks allowed Mobil to buy an equal amount of time to state its
position with regard to the energy crisis. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
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which is based upon rules and standards that are known to all
concerned parties.
194
The proposals to be advanced fall into four categories:
first, standards of controversiality, balance, and selection of
appropriate spokesmen for a reply in the political context;
second, a proposal for a system of intermediate sanctions for
fairness doctrine violations; third, a proposal for a system of
offsetting individual access time with time that the broadcasters
may use that is not subject to the fairness doctrine; and, finally,
a suggestion for a minor change in the pleading requirements
for filing a complaint with the Commission.
A. Standards
As described in the previous sections, the FCC's application
of the fairness doctrine has been inconsistent, with similar cases
decided differently; ineffective, since few citizen complaints are
acted upon because of either procedural obstacles or FCC re-
luctance to act, with no corresponding increase in broadcaster
freedom to speak out because the Commission retains the dis-
cretion to find almost any program to be unfair; and potentially
repressive, since there is the appearance of almost unbridled
discretion in the hands of appointed agency commissioners.
While recognizing the argument that flexibility in the agency is
needed to avoid infringing upon first amendment rights of the
broadcasters and of individual members of the public, the dis-
cussion of the FCC decisions has attempted to show that the
very lack of known standards has seriously infringed the rights
which are nominally to be accommodated by the FCC.
The standards to be developed below are all based upon
two central propositions. First, the fairness doctrine should be
used to keep the public informed about issues upon which it or
its elected representatives will vote, in an effort to make that
vote both informed and representative. Accurate information
about the options to be considered in any public choice is
fundamental to the concept of a participatory democracy. '9
Second, given the importance of this information to the effec-
tive working of such a democracy, any questions of definition
or interpretation of the proposed standards should be resolved
in favor of providing more information to the public. As Mr.
Justice White stated in Red Lion, "It is the right of the [public to
be fully and fairly informed] .. .which is paramount."
'1 96
194 The FCC clearly has the authority to promulgate regulations and to enforce its
views as to what the Act and the Constitution require. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1970).
'9 Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
196 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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1. Controversiality
As discussed above, the problem in this area is that many
things are controversial to many people, but no one knows what
is going to be controversial to the FCC. It is suggested that an
objective test of "an issue of public importance" be based upon
the following four criteria. A controversial issue would be one
that was: related to the subject of an upcoming public vote or
referendum; seen to be an election issue in a campaign for
public office, automatically including the fact of candidacy it-
self; related to the subject of pending legislation or legislative
hearings in the local, state, or federal legislature;1 97 or held by
petition to be controversial by some reasonable percentage of
the station's service area population. 98 The first three criteria
are implicit in many of the FCC's decisions; t ' 9 the fourth,
which is not expected to be a significant factor, is a "safety
valve" provision. The four criteria would be uniformly applica-
ble to all programming: regular program material, paid politi-
cal broadcasts, commercials, news reports, and public affairs
programming.
Before such a test can be applied, several terms require
definition: What constitutes an issue, in light of the sub-issue
exception of current FCC decisions? What is meant by the term
"related" as used in "related to the subject of an upcoming vote
or legislative bill"? These terms should be interpreted expan-
sively. If a complainant can define an issue which is controver-
sial under the tests proposed above and which was presented in
an unfair manner, the licensee should have the duty to balance
it. The party claiming a subject not to be "related" should bear
the burden of proving it to be clearly unrelated. Thus, any
'17 Multi-state service area stations would have to scan the legislatures of each of
the states served. While it would be possible to include matters pending before the
executive and judicial branches and those before administrative agencies, such an
approach has been rejected because of the huge quantity of material that would be
involved. There is good reason for the public to be better informed about pending
legislation: elected delegates of the people will be voting on the questions in Congress.
198 In 1934, the Senate passed somewhat similar criteria, providing that ".... if any
licensee shall permit any person to use a broadcasting station in support of or in
opposition to any candidate for public office, or in the presentation of views on a public
question to be voted upon at an election, he shall afford equal opportunity ... for the
presentation of opposite views on such public questions." Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 108 n.4 (1973) (quoting Hearings on
S. 2910 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1934)).
The Senate criteria were deleted from the Act in the conference committee. H.R. REP.
No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1934).
"'See, e.g., Mrs. H.B. Van Velzer, 38 F.C.C.2d 1044 (1973) (the evolution case,
discussed at note 70 supra & accompanying text); Accuracy in Media, Inc., 40 F.C.C.2d
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error committed would be on the side of presenting an un-
necessary rebuttal rather than failing to present a necessary
balancing program.
It is important to realize that this test is a narrower one
than the FCC's current subjective test, in that those subjects not
falling into one of the suggested categories would not have to
be fairly treated. The factual situations discussed above provide
several examples of the way in which the results under this
proposed test of controversiality would result in different deci-
sions than the Commission's current tests. Thus, in the absence
of legislation, public referendum, or campaign dispute, the Air
Traffic Congestion and Air Safety200 program would have been
totally exempt, including the sub-issue of the competence of
private pilots. In the cigarette situation,20 ' the fairness obliga-
tion would have been imposed during the pendency of the
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965,202 but would
have ceased once the Act was adopted. Similarly NEPA
20 3
would have been a factor in the automobile and gasoline cases
only until it was enacted. The proposed test may nevertheless
prompt more fairness doctrine discipline by making those viola-
tions that do occur more difficult to ignore.
Under the proposed test of controversiality, the foreign
events "exception"20 4 would be severely limited, since legislation
providing for military and economic aid must be passed by
Congress on a yearly basis. Coverage of events in a recipient
country would be subject to scrutiny under the fairness doctrine
in order that decisions about such aid be based on full informa-
tion rather than on potentially one-sided representations. It
should be noted, however, that the suggested criteria would not
require that events in nonrecipient countries, for example,
Northern Ireland, be fairly reported.
The private disputes "exception"20 5 would clearly continue,
since such a dispute would not fit into any of the categories
unless it became a campaign issue. However, in the adoption
958 (1973) (the pensions case, discussed at notes 95-100 supra & accompanying text).
But see David I. Caplan, 38 F.C.C.2d 1027 (1973) (the gun control case, discussed at
note 71 supra & accompanying text).
200 National Broadcasting Co., 25 F.C.C.2d 735 (1970) (discussed at notes 77-83
supra).
201 Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), afffd sub nom. Banzhaf v.
FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969) (discussed at
notes 149-62 supra & accompanying text).
202 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1970).
203 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (Supp. 1973).
204 See text accompanying notes 88-91 supra.
20- See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
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case discussed above,206 an expansive definition of "related"
might have required the Ferro v. Bacile case to be fairly treated
as one element in the discussion of the proposals to change the
New York state adoption laws.
Two caveats are in order at this point. First, no station is
required to cover every controversial issue or every aspect of a
controversial issue; it must, however, treat fairly those con-
troversial issues, or aspects of controversial issues, that it does
address. Second, since FCC scrutiny of licensee performance is
triggered by a citizen complaint, there is no reason to expect
more Commission scrutiny under an objective standard of con-
troversiality than under the current subjective tests. There may
be more complaints investigated, however, since the definition
of issues will be simplified by the existence of standards known
to the public.
2. Balance
The FCC has avoided explicitly or implicitly promulgating
any minimum ratio of primary issue time to balancing time that
will satisfy the fairness doctrine's requirements. 20 7 This inaction
is the result of a fear that such a ratio would be an improper
infringement of the licensee's discretion.20 8 But because the
Commission is called upon to determine ultimately what a fair
balance is, this position serves the appearance of licensee discre-
tion more than it does licensee discretion itself. Further, leaving
discretion in the licensee means, in this context, allowing the
licensee to balance as little as possible within the vague
parameters of "fairness." Since the broadcaster has had to pre-
sent balancing material out of fear of FCC action, yet at least
one member of the public (the complainant) still feels unin-
formed, this sort of discretion serves no first amendment
right; rather it serves a subordinate interest in maximizing
revenues.
2 09
A related problem is the Commission's examination of the
amount of time devoted to each side, without a comparable
scrutiny of the audience size or identity. Given the constitu-
tional justification for the fairness doctrine, this test of balance
is an unrealistic one. Thus, the presentation of an issue on
256 Bernard T. Callan, 30 F.C.C.2d 758 (1971) (text accompanying notes 84-86
supra).
207 See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.
20 See note 112 supra.
209 Revenues are maximized, in this context, by avoiding both the necessity of
having to provide free time for fairness presentations, and any possible alienation of
the audience as a result of presenting controversial speakers.
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television during prime time cannot, in any realistic way, be
balanced by a Sunday morning public affairs program.
Two major changes in FCC policy would meet these prob-
lems of balance. First, some fixed minimum ratio of primary
issue to balancing time should be promulgated. Congress has
indicated in section 315210 that its sense of balance requires
fully equal treatment of both sides, in that politicians must be
provided equal time to balance the appearance of their oppo-
nents. Therefore, any FCC deviation from equal time for both
sides of an issue should be well justified.
Second, the balancing coverage of an issue should, to the
extent possible, be directed toward the audience which probably
saw or heard the original presentation. Given the FCC's recog-
nition of various types of time based upon audience size,211 it
would be relatively simple to require that prime time presenta-
tions be balanced in prime time; similarly, non-prime time
weekend presentations should be balanced during similar
weekend broadcasts. Under this set of proposals a licensee,
when faced with a complaint, would scan his broadcasts to find
those primary and balancing presentations which were broad-
cast during a time period comparable to that of the program
complained about. This would aid in achieving the required
balance of time devoted to each side of an issue. If a broad-
caster discovered that the program originally complained about
had already been overbalanced, there would be no need to
correct the imbalance, absent a second complaint.
3. Who Presents the Other Side?
With one exception, the current system, which gives the
licensee the discretion to select the spokesmen for the opposing
view and to determine the content of that presentation, is
reasonable. The exception is the area of paid and unpaid politi-
cal broadcasts where the ill-considered Zapple doctrine212 (refus-
ing to grant free time for fairness doctrine replies to political
advertisements) prevails. The public's right to be informed
would be furthered if a paid or unpaid presentation of one
candidate for an office imposed upon the licensee the obliga-
tion to make the amount of time mandated by the fairness
doctrine available to each of the other candidates for that of-
fice. If this were done, a political advertisement or program
would trigger the requirement that each of the other candidates
210 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
211 See, e.g., the prime time rules.
212 Notes 125-29 supra & accompanying text.
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representing discrete sides of the controversial issue be given
the opportunity to present a reply. Under the current Cullman
doctrine, if these other candidates could not pay for such time,
the licensee would be compelled to provide it free.
It may be objected that this requirement will place a great
burden on licensees, since they will be giving away a significant
amount of time during political campaigns. This, however, is
most unlikely. The more probable result is that the broadcasters
would charge fees for air time that reflected the costs of having
to give free time to the other candidates, or that political parties
would cut back on their paid advertising. It may also be ob-
jected that this measure would drive political campaign cover-
age from the air. This is not true either, however. What would
be driven from the air would not be news coverage, but rather
the paid political message that urges a slogan rather than a
position. Finally, this proposal might raise the objection that
some fringe candidates will be given free air time, but it is not
the place of either the FCC or the licensee to tell state and local
governments that their laws defining the qualifications for polit-
ical office are too loose. If a community desires diversity in its
candidates, it is not the broadcast industry's role to counteract
that choice.
Although CBS clearly indicated that there is no constitu-
tional right of access, neither is there a constitutional or statu-
tory bar to such a proposal. This single step, pulling paid politi-
cal messages within the ambit of the fairness doctrine free time
rules, and providing that free time opportunity to each of the
other candidates, could do much to reduce the legitimate need
for massive campaign financing. If one party could not obtain
an advantage in exposure to the public through its superior
finances, the incentives to accumulate those funds would at
least be reduced. Moreover, the adoption of this proposed sys-
tem, with its disincentives to use paid political advertising, may
result in broadcast coverage of campaigns without the huckster-
ism that has characterized political campaigns in this country.
4. Summary
These proposed standards do not eliminate the Com-
mission's discretion entirely. Such a step is neither possible nor
desirable. The standards proposed above213 are intended to
213 One additional proposal which was considered but rejected concerned the "uni-
verse" within which broadcast presentations must be balanced. The essence of the
proposal is that one broadcaster could use the presentations of another broadcaster in
the same service area to balance an unfair program. While superficially an appealing
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limit that discretion and to have the Commission serve, more
nearly than is now the case, the interests of the public which it
is statutorily bound to protect, the interests of the licensees
which it must respect, and the interests of the individual com-
plainant who believes that a licensee has failed to meet his
obligations. The proposals below are intended to give further
effect to the new emphasis on the licensees' first amendment
rights seen in CBS, and to provide some incentive for licensees
to open their facilities to individuals desiring to speak out.
B. Intermediate Sanctions: The After-the-Fact Exemption
As developed above, one of the problems with the current
system of sanctions imposed by the FCC for fairness doctrine
violations has been the Commission's failure to develop any
sanctions falling between the "lifted eyebrow" and the threat of
nonrenewal of the license. 214 It was suggested that this resulted
in reluctance on the part of the FCC to impose either sanction
for fear that the minor sanction would lose its effect and that
imposition of the major sanction would not be approved by the
courts except where overall performance was found wanting. In
this Section, a system of intermediate sanctions will be pro-
posed, sanctions which also provide licensee journalistic judg-
ment some insulation from FCC scrutiny.
It is proposed that a given amount of time, to be used at
the licensee's option, be exempt from the requirements of the
fairness doctrine. The system of complaint, investigation by the
FCC, and quasi-judicial finding would be retained; but, if the
licensee felt that the program presented was fair or wished for
other reasons not to balance, he could exempt the program by
using part of his total exemption. For example, if the FCC were
to provide that a licensee could exempt six hours of broadcast
time per year 215 from the fairness doctrine obligations, NBC in
the Pensions situation could have elected, upon the determina-
tion that a controversial issue had been unfairly presented, to
take that hour as one of the six it could exempt during that
year.
suggestion, one quickly can see that rather explicit rules would have to be promulgated
in order to limit the use of one extremist program to balance many opposite presenta-
tions and to establish priorities to determine which of many broadcasters may claim to
be balanced by the presentation. It is felt that the need for these rules, coupled with the
more complex inter-station information needed by the FCC to determine if the offend-
ing program has been balanced and the additional loss of fairness caused by an
expanded "universe," make the proposal less than desirable.
214 Text accompanying notes 55-65 supra.
21 There are approximately 1,280 hours of prime time per television broadcast
year.
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:1283
Clearly the exemption system would impose some costs on
the public's right to be informed, since the purpose of the
system is to allow unfair presentations. To mitigate these ef-
fects, the FCC could regulate the use of the exempt time provi-
sion. First, since it is in the context of the franchise that the
public's right to balanced information is most significant, the
one-sided presentation of an issue determined to be controver-
sial because of an upcoming election could not be exempted
during some critical period prior to the election, or, alterna-
tively, could be exempted only at a penalty rate (for example,
two hours of exempt time for a one-half hour presentation).
Similarly, the equal time provisions of section 315 should be
retained. Second, when balancing is no longer practically possi-
ble because of the passage of time and events, exemption
should be mandatory. This would provide an incentive to pre-
sent a balancing broadcast in timely fashion. Third, no two
broadcasters in the same medium, radio or TV, and the same
service area could exempt a program on the same issue within
some reasonable period, for example three months, of each
other. Fourth, the exemption would have to be used in blocks
of time that correspond to the length of the program in which
the unbalanced presentation occurred. Thus, if a one-hour
program contained a five-minute section that was unfair, the
licensee would have to exempt the entire program. Unfair
commercials could only be exempted by exempting a block of
time, for example fifteen or thirty minutes. Finally, the person-
al attack rules should be retained, not solely for the protection
of the public, but for the protection of attacked individuals.
The exemption system proposed here relies upon the value
of the exempt time to the broadcaster for its effectiveness. It
has value because it permits him to speak out on a controversial
subject without having to present views to which he is opposed,
a traditional first amendment right.216 It must be highly valued
to prevent such abuses as exemption of product commercials,
paid political announcements, and similar material as a matter
of course. Rather than try to define abuse, the FCC could
maintain the integrity of the system by increasing the value of
the exempt time. Some of the steps outlined above, such as the
rules that require time to be exempted in blocks of fifteen
minutes or more, are designed to maintain the value of the
exempt time. If it developed that an initial allotment of exempt
time were sufficiently large that abuses occurred, the Commis-
216See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 150-55 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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sion could increase the value of the time by reducing the total
time that may be exempted. A licensee who might use one of
six hours to exempt two or four commercials may be unwilling
to do so with one of only two such hours.
No sanction should be imposed upon a licensee simply
because he used up his entire allotment of exempted time. The
appropriate sanction for using more than the entire exemption
could be a reduced exemption in the remaining year or two
years of the license period, a one-year renewal period with a
reduced exemption, no renewal, or revocation. One of the
benefits of this exemption system is that it provides a ready test
of a good faith effort to meet the requirements of the fairness
doctrine in the licensee's overall programming. In the example,
from zero to six hours per year of unfair exempted time is a
good faith effort, over six hours is not. In view of the language
of CBS emphasizing the "overview" program regulation exer-
cised by the FCC, it seems quite unlikely that the Court would
uphold the denial of a license renewal based upon a single hour
of unfair programming. The system of exemptions proposed
here is an attempt to recognize explicitly and to codify that
result.
C. Free-Time Offset
The third proposal is designed to give licensees an incen-
tive to provide individuals and groups with access to their
facilities. Licensees would be given time which was exempt from
the requirements of the fairness doctrine in some proportion to
that time which they provide to the public for individual and
group access, and would thus be encouraged to promote public
access broadcasting. The time provided to the public would be
free to the speaker; free of any licensee editorial control once
the speakers were selected, with the selection to take place in a
non-discriminatory fashion from a pool of speakers meeting
general criteria established by the licensee; exempt from the
fairness doctrine, but so identified; subject to the personal
attack and equal time rules; unavailable to station employees
and their relatives, advertisers, or public officials and their
spokesmen; 217 and available to individual groups or speakers in
units of not less than fifteen minutes.218 The licensee's offset
time would be available in unlimited amount in some propor-
217 The party or parties not controlling the chief executive position of the relevant
government agency would be eligible under this program.
218 The 15 minute rule would eliminate most talk shows and panel presentations.
The object is to provide sufficient time for the presentation of a coherent position, not
mere random opinions.
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tion to the public access time provided, subject to standards for
determining balance; 219 unavailable when the public access time
is provided to meet the licensee's fairness doctrine obliga-
tions;22 0 subject to the personal attack and equal time rules
but, of course, exempt from the fairness doctrine; identified
during the presentation as exempt from the requirements of
the fairness doctrine; and unavailable for use to speak out
about an election issue within some critical period prior to the
election.
It is to be hoped that both public access time and the offset
time would be used for the presentation of background infor-
mation about current controversial issues, potential future is-
sues, minority views on issues of importance, and such other
informational subjects as may be suggested by the public, al-
though such use of the time would not be required. If broad-
casters were to participate at all, they would, for purely finan-
cial reasons, have an interest in selecting interesting spokesmen
and in helping to stage entertaining and informative shows.
Since there would be no requirement that a licensee accept any
particular spokesman or participate at all, there would be no
pressure on him to broadcast amateur productions. This pro-
posal invites experimentation with public access broadcasting.
Although adoption of this proposal would result in some loss of
fair time, it could help make the broadcast media a true mar-
ketplace of ideas. If such a marketplace is the constitutional
goal of regulation, lowering the barriers to entry would be a
pro-competitive step in the spirit of Red Lion and CBS.
D. Procedural Issue
The final proposal is that the FCC revise its procedural
requirements concerning the sufficiency of complaints. The
current system, requiring that the complainant set out facts
sufficient to demonstrate that the licensee probably has not
balanced an issue in his overall programming, virtually elimi-
nates complaints by ordinary citizens who see a television show
or hear a radio program that seems to be one-sided. An FCC
investigation of those improperly pleaded complaints which
have a high level of plausibility would more faithfully serve the
interests represented by the fairness doctrine than does the
current dismissal of complaints for inadequacy without any ex-
amination of the merits. Procedural disposition of important
.Le., a Sunday morning access program could not generate prime time offset
time.
220 Additionally, public access time could not be used to balance a lajer presentation
of the licensee, unless he gave up the free offset time generated by the access time.
REGULATION OF COMPETING RIGHTS
questions satisfies neither the public nor the public's right to be
informed.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to develop three views of the
regulation of the broadcast media as it affects the first amend-
ment rights of the broadcasters, the individuals who desire to
speak out, and the public. The judicial view was presented first.
The fairness doctrine as interpreted by the Supreme Court
represents a compromise between the public's right to be in-
formed, as articulated in Red Lion, and the first amendment
freedoms of the broadcasters, as developed in CBS.
The FCC's view of its role, as expressed in its decisions, was
developed next. This Comment has shown that few standards
have been promulgated, as either regulations or case-by-case
principles of decision, that those few standards that do exist
have been inconsistently applied, and that much discretion has
been retained by the Commission, enabling it to act as it wishes
at any given time. The role implicit in that discretion is not that
of protector of the public, but rather of preserver of agency
power.
Finally, a set of proposals was advanced in an effort to
suggest how the regulatory agency could work to advance the
conflicting legitimate interests in this important area. These
proposals advocated, first, standards which would largely define
the relationships of the licensee, the FCC, and the individual;
second, a system which would return the FCC to a review of
the licensee's overall performance rather than close scrutiny of
individual programs; and, third, a system which would provide
incentives to licensees to provide for individual access to the
airwaves. These proposals are designed to achieve a balance
among the first amendment rights of licensees to broadcast as
they wish, of individuals to speak out over the airwaves, and of
the public to be informed. Only when this balance is achieved
will the broadcast media be able to achieve their potential as the
largest and most effective marketplace of ideas.
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